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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNET·TE HARROP, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ALFRED BECKMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Oase No. 
9868 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action wherein plaintiff seeks damages 
for personal injurie'S suffered by her when she was struck 
by a boat owned and operated by the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWEH COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment fror plaintiff defendant appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks only that this Court affirm the 
judgment of the Trial Court. 
ST.AT'EMENT OF FACTS 
On July 24, 1958, Plaintiff, Annette Harrop, then 20 
years of age, was water skiing at the E.ast Canyon Reser-
voir in S:alt Lake County (R. 47, 77). The day was hot 
and sunny (Ro 51). Testimony at the trial varied as, to 
the condition of the water at the scene of the accident. 
Plaintiff testified that the water was calm, but that 
waves caused hy the boat which had been pulling her 
were 5· to 6 inches high (R .. 78, 86). D·efendant, and other 
witnesses called by defendant, testified that there was 
a 15 mile per hom wind (R. 91) and that the waves were 
8 to 12 inches high (R. 101, 117) o At approximately noon 
time she fell from her water s:kis (R. 47 -49) 0 Because 
of the fact that she was wearing a life jacket she floated 
with her head .and shoulders out of the water (Ro 134). 
After falling she attempted to retrieve her skis, which 
were floating near her approximately 13 feet apart (R. 
136-137) 0 On the same day defendant, Alfred Beckman, 
was operating an outboard motor boat which was ap-
proximately 14 feet long, 4¥2 feet wide, and weighed 
approximately 550 pounds (Ro 91)0 At the time of the 
accident he w:as pulling one water skier, and two persons 
were in the boat with him (Ro 92) o Plaintiff testified that 
after she had been in the water approximately one min-
ute (Ro 48, 66), and had failed to retrieve either of her 
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3 
skis (R. 136), she heard a s.cream, looked up, and saw a 
boat with the operator and two girls in it, and the oper-
ator had his head turned back (R. 47). She raised heT 
arm to protect herself, but was struck by the bo:at, the 
force of the impact forcing her down into the water (R. 
47). Defendant and his companions turned their boat 
around, picked her up, and took heT to the shore. She 
was bleeding from the head and arm (R. 49'). On shore 
a crowd gathered, and as plaintiff was lying on the grass 
the defendant said, "Oh, I didn't even see her, I hit her" 
(R. 49). Defendant, and a witness called by him, denied 
that this statement was made (R. 106, 124). Defendant 
testified that he was traveling at approximately 20 miles 
per hour, about 50 feet from the shore line at the time 
of the accident, and indicated that he was approximately 
80 feet from the plaintiff when he saw her for the first 
time (R. 101). He did not immediately recognize the 
object as a hwnan head, but when he did realize what it 
was, he swung the boat to the left and cut the engine 
(R. 101-102, 107). Plaintiff was struck on the head and 
arm by the right side of the boat (R. 111, 134). At the 
moment of impact defendant had driven the boat 150 
feet in a straight line, without any turns (R. 109). At 
the time ·of the accident there· were between 30 and 50 
boats on the re·servoir (R. 48, 94), but there were no other 
boats in the immediate area (R. 93, 83, 133). 
Mter instructing the jury, the court submitted a 
verdict to them in the form of spe'<~ial interrogatories. 
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Two of the questions propounded, .and the answers given 
by the jury are as follows ( R.133): 
"Proposition 1: The defendant was negligent 
in not kHeping a proper lookout : Yes. 
"Proposition 2: ·The Plaintiff was contri-
buto·rily negligent while she was in the water by 
not keeping a proper lookout: No." 
Appellant raises six points on appeal, but eonden-
sed, they raise only three issues : Negligence, 'Contribu-
tory Negligence and Assumption of Risk. Argument in 
this brief will be limited to those three basic issues. 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
The issues of law raised in the motion for directed 
verdict and the motion for new trial are those previously 
mentioned: Negligence, Contributory Negligence, and 
Assumption of Risk Detailed argument on these points 
will he found under points two, three and four. However, 
it should be stated at this stage in the argument, that 
in denying these motions the trial court was following 
the policy of the Supreme Court, set forth in Webb vs. 
Olin Mathieson Chemical Co'l"poration, 9 Utah 2d 275, 
342 P. 2d 109·4, 1101 (1959): 
"It is the declared policy of this court to 
zealously protect the right of trial by jury and 
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nort to take issues from them and rule .as a matter 
of law except in clear cases." 
As will be pointed out later, the instant case con-
tained conflicting evidence concerning the .actions that 
each of the parties contend will prove negligence or con-
tributory negligence. The issues, therefore, were properly 
submitted to the jury. 
POINT 2 
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS 
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, AND THERE IS 
SUF,FI'CIENT EVIDENCE TO UPHOLD THE JURY'S FIND-
ING 'THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
Unless the question of negligences is free from 
doubt, the Court cannot pass upon it as a question of 
law. If the court is in doubt whether reasonable men 
might arrive at different conclusions, then this very 
doubt determines the question to be one of fact for the 
jury and not one of law for the court. Webb vs. Olin 
Mathieson Chemical Corpo~ation, supra. The question 
of negligence is one of fact for the jury reg.ardle,ss of 
whether the uneertainty occurs because of a conflict of 
evidence or because from the facts, men might honestly 
draw different conclusions. Y oshitoJiro Okuda vs. Rose, 
5 Utah 2d 39, 296 P. 2d 287 (1956). In other words, negli-
gence is a question for the jury unless all reasonable 
men must draw the same conclusion from the facts as 
they are shown. Charvoz vs. Cottrell, 12 Utah 2d 25, 361 
P. 2d 516 (1961); Jensen v.s. DO'len, 12 Utah 2d 399, 367 
p. 2d 191 (1960); Best vs. Huber, 3 Utah 2nd 177, 281 
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P. 2d 208 ( 1955). Particularly where the witness-es are 
parties having an interest in the action, the circumstances 
should he evaluated hy the jury, in whose province lies 
the power to believe or disbelieve the testimony and evi-
dence, to ·observe the demeanor of the witnesses, and to 
draw such reasonable conclusions from the whole record 
as may be warranted. M orby v.s. Rogers, 122 Utah 5-!0, 
252 P. 2d 231 (1953). In order for the Court to grant a 
request for .a directed verdict or judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, grounded on non negligence of the de-
fendant, the record must disclose no evidence against the 
party so requesting, upon which reasonable minds could 
find lrim guilty of the negligence charged. M orby vs. 
Rogers, supra. 
There is no conflict in the evidence and no denial 
that the accident did occur, that defendant's boat struck 
the plaintiff causing her injury. Plaintiff testified that 
at the time of the accident defendant's head was turned 
aw.ay from his direction of travel, and she also testified 
that -after she was removed from the reservoir, and was 
lying on the .grass, the defendant stated that he hadn't 
seen her. D-efendant and other witnesses deny these facts, 
but the f.act remains that she was there to be seen for at 
le·ast one minute, and she was not seen until it was too 
late to avoid hitting her. There was therefor, sufficient 
evidence, if believed, from which to find the defendant 
negligent. There was a conflict in some of the evidence, 
and the- jury, being present in court, observed the candor 
and demeanor ·of the witnesses, and chose which to be-
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lieve. In answer to the question propounded to them 
concerning the negligence of the defendant they an-
swered that he was negligent in not keeping proper look-
out. T'here is ample evidence to justify this finding. 
POINT 3 
THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO UPHOLD THE 
JURY'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
As is the case with the question of negligence, con-
tributory negligence is a question for the jury unless all 
reasonable men must draw the s.ame conclusions from the 
facts as they are shown. Rogalski vs. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304 (1955); Moore vs. Miles, 
108 Utah 167, 158 P. 2d 676 (1945). See also Glenn vs. 
Gibbons & Reed Co., 1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P. 2d 1013 (19'54). 
In order to be guilty o£ contributory negligence as a 
matter of law the evidence must be undisputed and the 
facts must not be conflicting and must clearly prove that 
one acted in a manner in which a reasonable prudent 
person would not have acted under the circumstances, 
or that one failed to act in such a manner as a reasonable 
prudent person would have acted under the circum-
stances. Allison vs. McCarthy, 106 Utah 278, 147 P. 2d 
870 (1944). Only in a clear case, where all reasonable 
minds would agree, should the issue of contributory negli-
gence be taken from the jury. Compton vs. Ogdevn Union 
Ry. Depot Co., 120 Utah 453, 235 P. 2d 515 (1951). In 
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determining whether this plaintiff is contributarily negli-
gent as a matter of law, :the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom must be viewed in ·a light most 
favorable to her. Roach vs. Kyremes, 116 Utah 405, 211 
P. 2d 181 (19-49). 
Contrary to what defendant argues, plaintiff did not 
~oluntarily put herself in a positron of peril. She volun-
tarily went water skiing, but she did not voluntarily fall. 
After she had fallen she attempted to retrieve her skis, 
which were floating in the water around her. She had 
been in .the water for approximately one minute when 
she was struck. It is true that she did not wave her anns 
or raise .a water ski in the air, obviously for the reason 
that she had not yet retrieved the skis. Also, in com-
paring a boat moving at 20 miles per hour and a swim-
mer floating in the water, such a swimmer is absolutely 
helpless, and .any attempt on her part to avoid being hit 
by the boat, would be an impossibility. All of these facts, 
circumstances, and possibilities were properly before the 
jury, for it cannot be said that all reasonabJe minds would 
draw the same cooclusrons concerning what actions were 
reasonable or unreasonable under those ·circumstances. 
The jury must have felt that her actions were reasonable 
under the circumstances, since they responded to the 
question put to them by the Court, that plaintiff was not 
contributorily negligent. There is ample evidence to sup-
port this finding. 
POINT 4 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF DE-
FENDANT'S INDEPENDENT A'CT OF NEGLIGENCE. 
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Contrary to Appellant's contentions, plaintiff did 
not request that the jury be alllowed to deliberate on the 
issue of Assumption of Risk. Plaintiff asked for the 
following instruction (R. 4-5): 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
One is said to assume a risk when she volun-
tarily manifests her assent to dangerous conduct, 
or to the creation or maintainence of a dangerou8 
condition, and voluntarily exposes herself to that 
danger; or when she knows, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care would know that danger exists in 
either the conduct of another or in the condition, 
use or operation of property, and voluntarily 
places herself, or remains, within the position of 
danger. 
One who has thus assumed a risik is not en-
titled to recover for damage caused her without 
intention and which results from the dangerous 
condition or conduct to which she thus exposed 
herself. 
INST·RUOTION NO. 20 
One who embarks upon the sport of water 
skiing assumes only the normal risk incident to 
skiing on the water behind a boat. She does not 
assume the risk of an independent act of negli-
gence by the operators of other boats in or ·about 
the water. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
You are instructed that in the case at hand 
the plaintiff did not assume the ris:k o'f being in-
jured in the manner she claims, and you should 
not consider the defense of ass.um·ption of risk in 
your deliberations. 
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The Court correctly refused to give these instruc-
tions, .and the instructions requested by defendant on 
.assumption of risk, since the evidence at the conclusion 
of the trial did not justify the instructions. 
Assumption of risk requires knowledge by plaintiff 
of a specific defect or dangerous condition caused by 
defendant's negligence or lack of due care, which plaihtiff 
could have, but voluntarily and deliberately failed to 
avoid. Ferg1Mson vs. Jongsma, 10 Utah 2d 179, 350 P. 2d 
404 (1960). Under no stretch of the imagination can it 
be said that plaintiff had :lmowledge that defendant would 
act in the negligent manner that he did. Plaintiff had no· 
knowledge of the dangerous condition until she heard the 
scream and looked up to see the boat practically upon 
her, with the defendant looking ·away from the direction 
of travel. 'This Court has not had before it ·a case with 
similar circumstances. In fact, only one other case in 
the United States can be found involving the negligence 
of an operator of a motor boat, who had injured a fallen 
water skier. N'ugen vs. Hildebrand, 114 S.E. 2d 896 (W. 
V a. 1960), was an action for personal injuries sustained 
by the plaintiff when he fell while water skiing, and was 
struck by the propeller of a boat owned and operated by 
the defendant. The jury returned a verdict· in favor of 
the pJaintiff in the amount of $50,000.00. The accident 
had occured on a "pond" where approximately 20 to 30 
motor boats were on the water during the day. However, 
at the time of the accident only three boats were on the 
"Pond." Plaintiff had fallen several times during the 
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day, since he was new on water skis. The case was similar 
to the instant case in its conflicting testimony. One wit-
ness testified that the defendant stated that plaintiff was 
so close when he fell off that he, the defendant, -could not 
avoid hitting him. The defendant denied making such a 
statement. The following contentions were made on ap-
peal: 
1. The evidence failed to establish primary negli-
gence as a matter ·of law. 
2. Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter o[ law. 
3. Plaintiff assumed the risk of the injury and was 
barred from recovery. 
The Supreme Court of West Virginia, having no 
other cases as precedent, held that the questions of negli-
gence and contributory negligence were for the jury. The 
case does not make clear whether or not the queS!tion 
of assumption of risk went to the jury, but we can pre-
sume that it did, and that the jury found in favor of the 
plaintiff. However, the Nugen case does not hold that 
the question of assumption of risk must go ·,to the jury, 
as contended by defendant. In Appellant's brief he has 
cited the Nugen case and has quoted the Syllabus by the 
Court, which, in part, reads as follows : 
"The Supreme Court of Appeals, Browning, 
President, held tlu:t t evidence presented questions 
for the jury as to primary negligence, proximate 
cause, contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk." 
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The Court's opinion does not discuss the question of 
assumption of risk, as b~ing a question for the jury, so 
the syllabus cannot be relied upon for authority, we must 
look to the opinion. In dis-cussing the doctrine of As sump~ 
tiou of Jtj.sk as it applied to the case, the court at 114 
S.E. 2d 896, 900, made the following statements : 
"Although the plaintiff was guilty of no negli-
gence he would be barred from recovery if he 
had voluntarily assumed the, risk of a !known 
hazard and his injury resulted therefrom." 
"The plaintiff in this case may have assumed 
the normal risk incident to skiing on the water 
behind the Foose boat, but he did not assume the 
risk of -an independent act of negligence by the 
defendant." 
The Court therefore affirmed the finding 'Of the jury. 
'The_ N ugen case, therefore, is directly in point with 
the instant case. There is probably no question but what 
plaintiff assumed the normal risk incident to water s!kiing 
behind a boat. Had she been injured in her fall from her 
water skis, had she collided with the boat that was pulling 
her, or had she beeome entangled with the tow rope, she 
could be said to have assumed the risk of such an aooi-
deDJt. However, it cannot be said that she could have 
expected another boat to strike her while she was float-
ing in the water after falling from her skis, for such an 
.act- was an independent act of negligence of the defand-
ant, and .not to be expected. She did not, therefore, as-
sume that risk, 'and should not be barred from recovery. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the judgment of 
the Trial Court should be affirmed and that she should 
have her costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. ALLEN 
630 Judge Building 
Bait Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
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